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Abstract 
 
We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect 
of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning 
(as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of 
inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, 
government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption 
and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional 
perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of 
development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has 
taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the 
perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
 The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on 
corruption’ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper is an 
extension of the debate without partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning as in 
the latter’s approach. The prime motivation for this extension is the possibility that, the 
effectiveness of foreign aid could be contingent on institutional thresholds, such that countries 
with higher initial levels of institutional quality are affected differently in comparison to their 
counterparts with lower initial levels of institutional quality. Though not in substance, yet in 
form, this hypothesis is the methodological underpinning of Okada & Samreth that is partially 
neglected by Asongu. In light of this development, policy makers should be curious to know how 
the results of Asongu may change if the context were examined with the methodological 
underpinnings of Okada & Samreth. Put in plainer terms; are the institutional perils of foreign aid 
questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place? An answer to the 
question also unites two important strands in the aid-institutions nexus literature.  
 From the interesting literature on aid and institutions, the debate has centered around three 
main questions. Firstly, do donors allocate more to poor countries with better institutions? 
Secondly, does foreign aid induce better or worse institutional quality? Thirdly, how do outsiders 
engineer a transition from the present state of informal institutions towards more formal 
institutional settings via foreign aid? The first strand of the debate is relevant because donors 
have widely supposed that aid would be more effective in countries with better institutions. 
Accordingly, the answer to the first concern also affects the response to the second. Hence, if 
donors give more aid to countries with better institutions, this would create an incentive for 
reformers in the recipient country to adapt to better institutions. A considerable bulk of the 
literature has found no evidence that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded with more 
development assistance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002). On the second 
question, a substantial chunk of the literature has pointed to the institutional (Knack, 2001; 
Asongu, 2012a) and democratic (Djankov et al., 2005) perils of foreign-aid, especially in 
ethnically fractionalized states (Svensson, 2000).  Lastly, there is the challenging third question 
(strand) about how aid would practically go about changing institutions in the interest of 
developing recipient countries. Accordingly, the transition from informal to formal institutions is 
somehow complex and attempts by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal 
institutions have not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. To this third 
concern, Dixit (2004) has presented an interesting argument as to how introducing rule-based 
institutions could actually make things worse, as they create outside opportunities for members of 
relationship-based networks
1
. 
 Cognizant of the above, this paper contributes to existing literature by examining the 
Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate in light of the last two strands (questions) 
within the same empirical framework. In adding some empirical structure to the issues raised, the 
present study provides answers to the following questions. Are the institutional perils of 
development-assistance contingent on existing institutional quality (second strand)? At what 
institutional thresholds is foreign-aid effective in improving institutional quality (third strand)? 
Are the institutional perils of foreign-aid questionable when greater domestic institutional 
development has taken place (second and third strands)? This study also contributes to existing 
literature by cutting adrift the mainstream approach to the debate that does not incorporate all 
dimensions of institutional quality. Accordingly, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu 
(2012a) debate lack a unifying framework that explores the most quantifiable government quality 
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 Network members can then cheat on their partners and vamoose to operate in the rule-based system. A society 
could get caught in-between formal and informal institutional settings with neither working well.  
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indicators currently available. To bridge this gap, we provide an exhaustive assessment with eight 
institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, 
government effectiveness, corruption, political stability, corruption-control and democracy)
2
.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Measurement and methodology issues are 
discussed in Section 2. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data  
We examine a panel of 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 with data from 
African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), Transparency International and 
La Porta et al., (2008, p. 289)
3
. Variable definitions and corresponding sources are presented in 
Appendix 3. Institutional quality dependent variables include: rule of law, regulation quality, 
corruption-control, voice & accountability, government-effectiveness, political stability (or no 
violence), corruption and democracy. The exogenous variable of interest is Net Official 
Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness purposes we use three different NODA 
indicators: Total NODA; NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries; 
and NODA from Multilateral Donors. While the first is used in the empirical section, the last two 
have been used for robustness checks.  Borrowing from the literature on the determinants of 
institutional quality, we control for foreign investment, trade, per capita economic prosperity and 
public investment (Goel & Nelson, 2005; Lambsdorff, 2006). We also control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity by employing dummies for low-income, English common-law and landlocked 
countries. Landlocked countries are inherently less developed (François & Manchin, 2006). 
English Common law countries have higher levels of institutional quality in Africa (Asongu, 
2011; Asongu, 2012b, p. 190). Also, government quality in Africa increases with income levels 
(Asongu, 2012b, p. 190). 
Details about the descriptive statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation 
analysis (showing the relationships between key variables used in the paper), and variable 
definitions are presented in the appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ ( Panel A of Appendix 1) of 
the variables used in the panel regressions shows that there is quite some variation in the data 
utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. 
Countries making-up the panel are presented in Panel B of Appendix 1. The purpose of the 
correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to address issues resulting from overparametization and 
multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not 
appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated.   
 
 
2.2 Methodology  
Consistent with recent literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 
2013), to determine whether existing levels of institutional dynamics affect how development 
assistance comes into play, we use quantile regression. This approach permits us to assess if the 
relationship among institutional dynamics and foreign-aid differs throughout the distributions of 
institutional dynamics (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). Thus, based on this estimation technique we 
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 Knack & Keefer (1995) have concluded that more indicators are needed to properly account for the quality of 
institutions (p. 223).  
3
 It should be noted that this time span is consistent with those employed by Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu 
(2012a). While the former have use data on 120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009, the latter has used 
data on 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
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are able to carefully examine the incidence of development assistance throughout the conditional 
distribution with particular emphasis on countries with the best and worst institutions. Quantile 
regression (hence QR) yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  Accordingly, the  th quantile 
estimator of the endogenous variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization 
problem. 
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Where   is in the ‘0 and 1’ interval. Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example 
the 10
th
 or 75
th
 quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the 
residuals. The conditional quantile of iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                      (2) 
where unique slope parameters are derived for each  th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is an institutional quality indicator while ix  contains a constant term, 
foreign-aid, foreign investment, trade, per capita economic prosperity, public investment and 
fixed effects (low-income, English common law and landlocked countries). 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Presentation of results  
The results presented in Tables 2-3 include OLS and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of separate quantiles in the 
conditional distributions of the institutional dynamic dependent variables. In the interpretation of 
estimated coefficients, it is worth noting that smaller values (in conditional distributions) of the 
dependent variables denote less institutional quality (in terms of democracy, rule of law, 
regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption, political stability, voice & 
accountability and corruption-control). Table 2 shows results for the rule of law, regulation 
quality, government effectiveness and political stability regressions while Table 3 reports those 
of voice & accountability, democracy, corruption and corruption-control.  
Table 1 below summarizes the foreign-aid effects on institutional development based on 
findings in Tables 2-3. The motivation for this summary is to synthesize the potential incidence 
of foreign-aid on institutional development when existing government-quality dynamics matter. 
Based on the summary of results, it could be concluded that, but for a thin exception (lowest 
quantile of voice & accountability) foreign aid broadly mitigates institutional quality. The 
positive incidence on voice & accountability could be attributed to the strict accounting standards 
required by donor organizations in recipient countries with inherently very low accountability 
standards. Most of the control variables are significant with the right signs. Landlocked countries 
inherently have lower levels of development (François & Manchin, 2006). English Common law 
countries have higher levels of institutional quality in Africa (Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012b, p. 
190). Government quality in Africa also increases with income levels (Asongu, 2012b, p. 190). 
The OLS findings are also broadly consistent with the negative incidence of foreign aid on 
institutional quality.  
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Table 1: Summary of results (foreign-aid effectiveness in institutional development)  
Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90  Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
Rule of Law  Regulation Quality 
-0.005* -0.008** -0.012* -0.011* -0.007  -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.012 
           
Government Effectiveness  Political Stability 
-0.006* -0.013*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.005  -0.004 0.001 -0.0003 -0.004 -0.006 
           
Voice & Accountability  Democracy 
0.008* 0.006 0.002 -0.007 -0.014**  -0.207*** -0.052 0.060 0.002 0.008 
           
Corruption   Control of Corruption 
0.006 0.002 0.0007 -0.005 -0.011  -0.0008 -0.001 -0.007** -0.004 -0.008 
           
*, **, ***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where institutional quality is 
least.  
 
3.2 Discussion 
For more than half a century, the political economy of foreign-aid has been widely 
debated in academic and policy-making circles. A substantial literature on institutions and 
development suggests that, Africa is poor because it is deficient of good institutions: 
dictatorships, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcement, political instability, 
high corruption, violence and hostile regulatory environment for private business (Easterly, 2005; 
Kodila-Tedika, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b). With respect to this strand, in order to end African 
poverty, the West needs to promote good institutions.  In response to how foreign-aid might 
promote good institutions in aid-recipient countries, much of the literature has focused on how 
institutions matter in the effectiveness of foreign-aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 
2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005). This present paper has united two strands 
of the debate in light of the recent development from Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu 
(2012a).  
From the available weight of empirical evidence (as summarized in Table 1 above), the 
following answers could be provided to the examined questions. But for a thin exception (voice 
and accountability in the lowest quantile), foreign-aid mitigates institutional development.  The 
institutional perils of foreign-aid are not questionable when greater domestic institutional 
development has already taken place.  Hence, the hypothesis that the institutional benefits of 
foreign aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa is not valid. Drawing from the 
Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate, it could be concluded that even without 
partially negating the former’s methodological standpoint, foreign aid remain perilous to 
institution development in Africa. These findings are broadly consistent with the early strand of 
literature supporting the thesis of a negative aid-development nexus (Mosley, 1992; Reichel, 
1995; Ghura, 1995; Boone, 1996; Pedersen, 1996).  
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Table 2: Rule of Law, Regulation Quality, Government Effectiveness and Political stability    
              
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Rule of Law   Regulation Quality  
Constant -0.755*** -1.809*** -1.199*** -0.460*** -0.266** -0.074  -0.251*** -1.432*** -0.470*** 0.083 0.121 0.252 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.819)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.452) (0.382) (0.107) 
Development Assistance -0.007* -0.005* -0.008** -0.012* -0.011* -0.007  -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.012 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.021) (0.097) (0.093) (0.407)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.258) 
FDI -0.003 -0.004 0.005** -0.003 -0.008** -0.015***  -0.005* -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.008** 
 (0.373) (0.527) (0.027) (0.380) (0.0149) (0.000)  (0.093) (0.282) (0.827) (0.710) (0.195) (0.014) 
Trade   -0.0001 0.0001 -0.002* -0.001 0.0009 0.004  -0.003*** 0.001** -0.003*** -0.006**** -0.004*** -0.003* 
 (0.876) (0.813) (0.089) (0.508) (0.506) (0.128)  (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.057) 
Per capita  GDP growth -0.005 -0.011*** -0.008 0.001 0.006 0.006  -0.003 -0.006 -0.015** -0.002 0.010 0.013 
 (0.455) (0.043) (0.209) (0.865) (0.549) (0.728)  (0.631) (0.385) (0.017) (0.791) (0.274) (0.215) 
Public Investment   0.052*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.036**  0.024*** 0.016 0.017 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.024** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037)  (0.000) (0.128) (0.101) (0.006) (0.000) (0.040) 
Landlocked  -0.030 0.134 0.125 -0.095 -0.050 -0.097  0.061 0.222** 0.065 0.041 0.079 0.067 
 (0.656) (0.158) (0.234) (0.214) (0.435) (0.163)  (0.302) (0.038) (0.477) (0.547) (0.251) (0.319) 
English  0.381*** 0.294*** 0.356*** 0.388*** 0.302*** 0.241**  0.344*** 0.257* 0.443*** 0.357*** 0.415*** 0.417*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)  (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Low Income  -0.354*** 0.152* -0.108 -0.391*** -0.504*** -0.652***  -0.190*** 0.190 -0.036 -0.325*** -0.402*** -0.405*** 
 (0.000) (0.080) (0.446) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.300) (0.674) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Pseudo R² 0.277 0.133 0.119 0.184 0.273 0.349  0.246 0.068 0.121 0.154 0.255 0.333 
Observations  367 367 367 367 367 367  366 366 366 366 366 366 
              
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Government Effectiveness   Political  Stability  
Constant -0.506*** -1.381*** -0.663*** -0.346** -0.062 0.106  -1.192*** -3.090*** -1.620*** -0.988*** -0.512*** 0.604 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.686) (0.548)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.114) 
Development Assistance -0.008** -0.006* -0.013*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.005  -0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.0003 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.062) (0.000) (0.218) (0.287) (0.374)  (0.332) (0.592) (0.769) (0.973) (0.652) (0.644) 
FDI -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.006* -0.0009  -0.009* -0.019 -0.010 -0.009* -0.011** -0.002 
 (0.355) (0.255) (0.178) (0.373) (0.097) (0.959)  (0.075) (0.591) (0.442) (0.090) (0.024) (0.894) 
Trade   -0.001** -0.0001 -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002  0.005*** 0.01**** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.0007 
 (0.032) (0.894) (0.000) (0.022) (0.101) (0.258)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.764) 
Per capita  GDP growth 0.0009 -0.002 0.002 0.017 0.011 -0.002  0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.013 
 (0.894) (0.716) (0.774) (0.208) (0.434) (0.808)  (0.636) (0.706) (0.816) (0.911) (0.875) (0.325) 
Public Investment   0.040*** 0.017*** 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.054***  0.060*** 0.045** 0.078*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.021 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.324) 
Landlocked  -0.073 0.213** 0.050 -0.149** -0.145* -0.124*  -0.122 0.048 -0.470*** -0.378** 0.066 -0.030 
 (0.239) (0.0173) (0.587) (0.037) (0.063) (0.079)  (0.224) (0.852) (0.000) (0.022) (0.630) (0.809) 
English  0.389*** 0.179** 0.385*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 0.453***  0.241*** 0.657*** 0.577*** 0.242* 0.136 0.064 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.226) (0.752) 
Low Income  -0.435*** -0.071 -0.297*** -0.559*** -0.694*** -0.733***  -0.132 0.228 -0.486*** -0.151 -0.199 -0.416** 
 (0.000) (0.482) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.234) (0.268 (0.002) (0.381) (0.216) (0.029) 
Pseudo R² 0.312 0.078 0.094 0.195 0.324 0.406  0.194 0.138 0.133 0.098 0.118 0.141 
Observations  359 359 359 359 359 359  368 368 368 368 368 368 
              
Notes.  Dependent variables are Regulation Quality , the Rule of Law,  Government-effectiveness and Political-stability.   *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Regulation Quality , the Rule of Law,  Government-effectiveness and Political-stability is least. P-values in brackets. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  
Landlocked: landlocked countries. English: English Common-law countries. Low income: low income countries.  
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Table 3: Voice & Accountability, Democracy, Corruption and Corruption-Control    
              
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Voice & Accountability    Democracy 
Constant -0.716*** -1.725*** -1.189*** -0.835*** 0.192 0.656***  0.741 -1.900** -0.194 -0.492 5.018*** 7.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.431) (0.004)  (0.224) (0.018) (0.634) (0.561) (0.001) (0.000) 
Development Assistance 0.005 0.008* 0.006 0.002 -0.007 -0.014**  -0.072*** -0.207*** -0.052 0.060 0.002 0.008 
 (0.257) (0.087) (0.147) (0.664) (0.304) (0.022)  (0.008) (0.000) (0.379) (0.136) (0.965) (0.819) 
FDI -0.007 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009  -0.060** -0.054 -0.041 -0.022 -0.035 -0.065*** 
 (0.125) (0.122) (0.891) (0.108) (0.115) (0.647)  (0.013) (0.594) (0.563) (0.332) (0.191) (0.000) 
Trade   -0.0003 0.002** -0.001 0.0004 -0.002* -0.0007  0.0005 -0.021 -0.0005 0.008 0.0001 0.011 
 (0.748) (0.018) (0.199) (0.739) (0.054) (0.744)  (0.922) (0.186) (0.892) (0.525) (0.987) (0.227) 
Per capita  GDP growth -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.022  0.102** 0.292*** 0.040 0.037 -0.001 -0.020 
 (0.672) (0.862) (0.591) (0.701) (0.789) (0.137)  (0.029) (0.000) (0.343) (0.455) (0.985) (0.781) 
Public Investment   0.023** -0.020** 0.023* 0.017 0.050** 0.026  0.185*** 0.152*** 0.032 0.120 0.068 0.021 
 (0.018) (0.042) (0.059) (0.143) (0.013) (0.141)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.402) (0.130) (0.520) (0.788) 
Landlocked  -0.180** -0.004 -0.314*** -0.236** -0.265*** -0.160*  -0.576 -0.883 -0.570 -0.178 -0.784 -0.707* 
 (0.038) (0.967) (0.003) (0.044) (0.007) (0.085)  (0.173) (0.403) (0.239) (0.861) (0.301) (0.058) 
English  0.510*** 0.156 0.584*** 0.833*** 0.398** 0.030  2.270*** 0.913 0.740** 2.706*** 3.305*** 1.319** 
 (0.000) (0.231) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.822)  (0.000) (0.185) (0.043) (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) 
Low Income  -0.207** 0.244* -0.079 -0.337*** -0.463*** -0.435***  1.073** 3.943*** 1.459** 0.174 -0.686 -1.003* 
 (0.031) (0.095) (0.462) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.029) (0.000) (0.0119) (0.785) (0.494) (0.067) 
Pseudo R² 0.119 0.0004 0.075 0.124 0.119 0.157  0.114 0.066 0.0003 0.072 0.081 0.128 
Observations  368 368 368 368 368 368  449 449 449 449 449 449 
              
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Corruption   Corruption-Control  
Constant 2.689*** 1.374*** 1.810*** 2.241*** 3.274*** 4.095***  -0.652*** -1.475 -1.206*** -0.593*** -0.149 0.188 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.364) (0.333) 
Development Assistance -0.005 0.006 0.002 0.0007 -0.005 -0.011  -0.002 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.007** -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.556) (0.196) (0.733) (0.921) (0.598) (0.217)  (0.510) (0.721) (0.639) (0.025) (0.485) (0.221) 
FDI 0.0006 -0.008 0.0002 -0.004 0.005 0.008  -0.002 -0.006 0.0001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.956) (0.296) (0.987) (0.803) (0.787) (0.599)  (0.459) (0.391) (0.965) (0.109) (0.255) (0.459) 
Trade   0.0003 0.004*** 0.002 0.004* 0.0007 -0.002  0.0005 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.00005 -0.001 
 (0.837) (0.003) (0.283) (0.078) (0.766) (0.243)  (0.480) (0.018) (0.297) (0.549) (0.970) (0.315) 
Per capita  GDP growth -0.027* -0.011 -0.024* -0.012 -0.007 -0.028  -0.013* -0.013 -0.007 0.007 -0.011 -0.014 
 (0.079) (0.240) (0.064) (0.474) (0.795) (0.308)  (0.072) (0.101) (0.661) (0.552) (0.369) (0.138) 
Public Investment   0.081*** 0.036*** 0.054** 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.115***  0.042*** 0.021** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Landlocked  0.229* 0.203* 0.209 0.159 0.492*** 0.334**  0.066 0.118 0.066 -0.028 0.104 0.118 
 (0.091) (0.084) (0.194) (0.437) (0.004) (0.010)  (0.310) (0.165) (0.418) (0.712) (0.293) (0.222) 
English  0.872*** 0.329*** 0.487*** 0.942*** 0.727*** 0.729***  0.256*** 0.165** 0.162** 0.126 0.273** 0.235* 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.019) (0.024) (0.153) (0.010) (0.073) 
Low Income  -1.142*** -0.120 -0.482** -1.337*** -1.712*** -1.795***  -0.392*** 0.043 -0.151* -0.393*** -0.665*** -0.764*** 
 (0.000) (0.391) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.615) (0.079) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R² 0.395 0.073 0.084 0.207 0.374 0.446  0.241 0.064 0.073 0.138 0.239 0.262 
Observations  277 277 277 277 277 277  359 359 359 359 359 359 
              
Notes.  Dependent variables are Voice & Accountability, Democracy, Corruption and Control of Corruption. *, **, ***, denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Voice & Accountability, Democracy, Corruption and Control of Corruption is least. P-values in brackets. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Landlocked: landlocked 
countries. English: English Common-law countries. Low income: low income countries.  
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4. Conclusion 
We have extended the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on 
‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological 
underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening 
the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, 
regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, 
control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency 
of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the 
institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic 
institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for 
foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality 
has been broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
 Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observa
tions 
       
 
 
 
Institutional 
Quality  
Rule of Law -0.706 0.682 -2.691 1.053 633 
Regulation Quality  -0.687 0.674 -2.729 0.905 631 
Government Effectiveness  -0.681 0.614 -1.853 0.807 598 
Political Stability  -0.557 0.958 -3.311 1.143 636 
Voice & Accountability -0.674 0.734 -2.174 1.047 636 
Control of Corruption  -0.607 0.623 -2.495 1.086 622 
Democracy 2.373 4.093 -8.000 10.000 750 
Corruption  2.984 1.065 1.000 6.400 462 
       
Development 
Assistance 
(DA) 
Total DA 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
DA from Multilateral Donors  4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
DA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
       
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Per capita Economic Prosperity 
(GDPpcg) 
2.326 6.702 -33.073 90.140 768 
Public Investment 7.449 4.500 0.000 39.984 655 
Financial Openness (FDI) 4.221 8.451 -8.629 145.20 557 
Trade Openness (Trade) 77.853 39.698 17.859 275.23 719 
       
 
Dummy 
variables  
English Common  law countries  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Landlocked countries  0.283 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
Low Income countries  0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
       
 Panel B: Presentation of Countries  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti,  Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sao Tomé & Principe,  Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe,  Tanzania, Comoros. 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  
DA: Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis  
                   
Institutional Quality  Foreign Aid Control Variables  
RL RQ GE PolS VA CC Demo C DA DAMD DADAC FDI Trade GDPpcg PubI Eng LL LI  
1.00 0.81 0.88 0.79 0.72 0.87 0.52 0.84 -0.20 -0.17 -0.20 0.001 0.17 0.08 0.22 0.17 0.02 -0.36 RL 
 1.00 0.81 0.63 0.70 0.72 0.48 0.72 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.14 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.05 -0.28 RQ 
  1.00 0.64 0.68 0.83 0.41 0.86 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.04 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.30 -0.05 -0.43 GE 
   1.00 0.65 0.68 0.52 0.67 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 0.04 0.30 0.10 0.24 0.05 -0.04 -0.25 PolS 
    1.00 0.66 0.75 0.65 -0.0009 -0.002 0.002 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.24 0.01 -0.14 V&A 
     1.00 0.48 0.88 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 0.01 0.16 0.006 0.21 0.12 0.02 -0.32 CC 
      1.00 0.42 -0.03 0.011 -0.05 -0.04 0.008 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.09 -0.02 Demo 
       1.00 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.03 -0.39 C 
        1.00 0.90 0.95 0.16 -0.10 0.00 0.19 -0.05 0.08 0.45 DA 
         1.00 0.73 0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.22 -0.03 0.13 0.47 DAMD 
          1.00 0.19 -0.09 -0.008 0.14 -0.05 0.05 0.38 DADAC 
           1.00 0.45 0.20 0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 FDI 
            1.00 0.17 0.18 0.18 -0.09 -0.35 Trade 
             1.00 0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 GDPpcg 
              1.00 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 PubIvt 
               1.00 0.11 -0.05 Eng 
                1.00 0.27 LL 
                 1.00 LI 
                   
RL: Rule of Law.  RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. V&A: Voice & Accountability. CC: Corruption-Control. Demo: Democracy. C: Corruption Perception Index.  FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. PubI: Public Investment. DA: Net Official Development Assistance. Eng: English Common Law countries. LL: Landlocked countries. LI: Low Income countries.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Source(s) 
Rule of Law    RL Rule of Law (estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality    RQ Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Effectiveness    GE Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political Stability    PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & Accountability   VA Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Control of Corruption  CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Democracy    Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank (WDI) 
    
Corruption  C Corruption Perception Index  Transparency 
International  
    
Development Assistance    1 DA Total Development assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    2 DAMD Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    3 DADAC Development Assistance from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
External Debt Flow  FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade(Openness) Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubI Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Per Capita Economic 
prosperity  
GDPpcg GDP per capita Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
English  Eng English Common law countries  La Porta et al. (2008, 
p. 289) 
    
Landlocked LL Landlocked Countries  ----- 
    
Low Income  LI Low Income Countries  World Bank (FDSD) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  FDSD: 
Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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